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Abstract
In this paper, two modes of non-binding communication between an expert and a decision-
maker are compared. They are distinguished mainly by the nature of the information transmitted
by the expert. In the rst one, the expert reports only his opinion (soft information) concerning the
desirability of a certain action, whereas in the second one, he is consulted to provide evidence (hard
information) to convince the decision-maker. The experts ability to provide evidence increases with
the precision of his information. The paper shows that requiring evidence is always benecial to
the decision-maker whereas it is benecial to the expert if and only if the preferences of both agents
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1 Introduction
In many economic, political and social environments, decision-makers (such as corporate CEOs,
investors, political leaders or jurors) do not have all the necessary knowledge to make the best deci-
sions. That is why they resort to experts (such as marketing specialists, management consultants,
stockbrokers, investment bankers, nancial advisors, scientic committee or investigators). In these
situations the sharing of information among agents is done strategically through communication
processes. Conicts of preferences between both parties can make the disclosure of information dif-
cult. In this paper, we characterize all equilibria of a non-binding interaction between an expert and
a decision-maker and analyze how these di¤er under two di¤erent forms of information-reporting.
The expert in our case a privately informed agent who is interested in the nal action chosen
by the decision-maker can be consulted in di¤erent ways. He can be consulted only to give an
opinion or any other soft information on a specic subject. He can also be consulted to explain
the basis of his opinion. In that case he has to provide facts, documents, proof or any other hard
information justifying his beliefs. Providing irrefutable proof (as for example the existence of a
given risk) makes him playing a more decisive role in the decision-making process. When sound
proof is established, the decision-maker has to make a decision that is consistent with the truth
revealed by the expert.
In this article, two games of communication are compared. In the rst game, the expert is
consulted by the decision-maker only to give an opinion concerning the desirability of a certain
action. In contrast, in the second game, the decision-maker consults the expert to bring evidence 
proof, arguments or facts to be convincing. Providing evidence makes it possible for the expert to
convince the decision-maker and the decision-maker can assess the accuracy or the precision of the
information observed by the expert. We compare equilibria of these two games regarding the welfare
of each agent to determine under what conditions on preferences to require evidence is benecial.
The two games studied have a common structure. Each one is a sender-receiver game with
costless and non-binding messages. Our two games only di¤er through the assumption made on
the information that the expert can transmit (either soft or hard information). In the rst game,
whatever information he observes, the expert can lie about his own opinion as much as he wants.
Formally, the set of available messages does not depend on the experts private information (cheap-
talk game). For instance, even if the information observed shows a strong probability that a specic
risk occurs, the expert can provide the decision-maker with an opinion indicating the contrary. On
the other hand, in the second game, the expert argues by certifying all or a part of his private
information to the decision-maker. Formally, some messages are only available for some specic
information (persuasion game). In this latter game, he can thus voluntarily prove some pieces
of his information by transmitting a message which would not be available to him under other
conditions (the proof of being in a state of the world is not accessible in another state). He can also
voluntarily hide some information by only presenting some vague arguments. However he cannot
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lie by certifying some wrong information because the needed messages are not available given his
information.
The ability of the expert to provide reliable information evidence increases with the precision
of the information he has observed. We assume that the minimum level of a given precision is based
on provable facts whereas the maximum level is not. For example, in the case of skills, a person can
prove he is a good musician by performing well a di¢ cult work, whereas there exists no analogous
way to prove that one is not a good musician. We suppose the expert is able to certify all payo¤-
relevant information he has observed. However, as long as he does not know everything, he is unable
to prove that he is not hiding any additional information. The provability is partial. Regarding
the precision of some specic piece of information, the expert can cover up some of what he knows
by providing documents he could have transmitted with less precise information. But he is unable
to provide all the documents he could have given with some more precise information. The set of
documents available to the expert increases with the precision of his information. In sum presenting
specic evidence proves that the experts precision of information is at least equal to a certain level.
But it does not exclude the possibility that his information is more precise than this level.
We o¤er a model as simple as possible in order to characterize all equilibria of both interactions.
We assume that the decision-maker has to choose an action that is part of a binary set such
as undertaking a specic project or not. Moreover, depending on the information collected, the
decision-maker and the expert may have potentially conicting preferences. That is, for a given piece
of information, either both agents share the same preferred action (both agents want the project to
be either undertaken or not) or they do not (one agent wants the project to be undertaken while
the other does not). Each agent would like the project to be undertaken only if the information is
at least as favorable as a specic level, or threshold of indi¤erence or reasonable doubt. Since both
thresholds may di¤er a given information may be su¢ ciently favorable to carry out the project for
one agent while it is not for the other.
Our main result shows that resorting to evidence is always benecial to the decision-maker
whereas it is benecial to the expert if and only if the preferences of both agents are di¤erent
enough. The idea that the provability of information (even if it is partial) is always benecial to the
decision-maker seems intuitive enough. However, the literature has a counter-example in a complete
provability setting (see, Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007)). In our case, the provability in the
evidence game often enables the decision-maker to extract all information using a skeptical strategy.
This strategy consists in taking his most preferred action according to his prior as long as the expert
does not report him convincing documents. But since provability is partial, this unraveling argument
does not always apply. The unraveling argument fails when the experts threshold of indi¤erence is
higher than the decision-makers one. The expert has then an incentive to withhold any document
that is not convincing him but would convince the decision-maker. In that case, equilibria may
take a non trivial form but we show even so that the decision-maker is better o¤ than when playing
the opinion game. In particular, there is an equilibrium in which the expert still reveals evidences
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that are convincing both. While when agentspreferences are di¤erent enough no information is
revealed at equilibrium of the opinion game. As for the expert, the idea that he prefers to provide
evidence if and only if the preferences of both agents are di¤erent enough is explained as follows.
In the opinion game, the equilibria characterize extreme economic situations since in a setting of
binary actions (even with a continuum of types) cheap-talk is a very coarse instrument. Indeed
either the preferences of both agents are close enough; so the decision-maker always applies the
recommendations of the expert. Or the preferences are not close enough; so the decision-maker is
really distrustful and does not listen to any recommendations. In this latter case, resorting to a
more precise mode of communication as providing evidence sometimes still makes it possible for the
expert to convince the decision-maker. Example 1 reects the results expected.
Example 1 (Market attractiveness). Consider a company deciding whether or not to enter a new
market. It uses consultant services to bring in information about the attractiveness of that market.
The CEO prefers to enter the market only if the probability of success following entry is higher than
his threshold of reasonable doubt. The work of the consultant consists in collecting and sorting out
various information on that new market (e.g., companiesnancial statements, uctuations in prot
margin, costs, revenues and potential demand). Due to parallel advice activity (as addressing key
strategies), the consultant has preferences with respect to his own (maybe di¤erent) threshold of
reasonable doubt. Any information collected is certied and cannot be forged. But the consultant
can voluntary delete some of it from the le he is putting together. He is the only person to know
the nature of his information whether his le supports the attractiveness or not and the precision
of this information to what extent the attractiveness is either sustained or ruled out. When he
is consulted only to give his opinion (or transmit any soft information) he can say whatever he
wants. Consequently it can be rational for the CEO to ignore any recommendation. So there is an
equilibrium in which no information is transmitted. In addition, if the preferences of both parties
are close enough, it can be rational for the CEO to trust the consultant. In this case, there is also an
equilibrium in which the consultant can manipulate the nal decision as he wants. To some extent,
it would be as if the consultant took the nal decision by himself. Conversely when he is consulted to
argue his opinion with documents, he can totally reveal or hide his private information. He just has
to provide the complete le or, on the contrary, to claim he has observed no relevant information
(providing an empty le). He can also decrease the precision of the transmitted information by
hiding some bits (by leaving out some document from his le). However he cannot increase this
precision because he cannot add non-existing certied document. Since the information transmitted
can now contain irrefutable evidence, the CEOs behavior that consists in never taking into account
the information revealed no longer supports any equilibrium. When the CEO is more reluctant
than the consultant to enter the new market, he can extract the most important pieces of the
consultants private information. To do so, he just has to be skeptical by deciding not to enter
unless he is presented with su¢ ciently convincing documents.
Example 2 (Trial). In a jury environment, the model is interpreted as follows. A person on trial,
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who is either innocent or guilty, can be either acquitted or convicted. We suppose that to render
his verdict, the decision-maker a judge or jury resorts to a investigator who is better informed.
The decision-maker prefers to condemn the defendant only if the probability of his guilt is higher
than his threshold of reasonable doubt. Consider that the information observed by the investigator
either supports the guilt or innocence of the defendant. For instance, it can be a video on which
one can see the defendant at a place far away from where the murder took place at the estimated
time of the crime. Or on the contrary, we can see the defendant at the exact place of the crime.
The investigator is the only person to know the nature of his information the video supports the
guilt or innocence of the defendant and the precision of this information either he has a video
showing the defendant simply arguing with the victim or literally killing him. The investigator can
continuously decrease the precision of the information transmitted by suppressing some images on
the video. However he cannot increase this precision, he cannot add non-existing images. Results
are as in the previous example. Here, the extraction of the consultants private information (when
asked to provide evidence) requires the judge to be more reluctant than the investigator to condemn
the defendant.
Example 3 (Public policy). We could also consider the case of a scientic committee regarding an
environmental or sanitary problem. The decision would be whether or not to authorize a product
that is known to be potentially harmful. The private information of the committee would be
collected in a scientic report. Only the committee would know the nature of his information 
either the report claims that the product is harmful or harmless  and the precision of it  for
instance, which steps of a scientic protocol dened by the public authorities beforehand have been
validated. In the same way, we could compare the situation where the scientic committee gives
only his opinion about the harm caused by the product to the situation in which he is obliged
to provide documents  such as the elements contained in the scientic report  to convince the
governing authority.
To assess whether resorting to evidence is benecial to both agents, we compare two distinct
games. This methodology can be criticized. An alternative method would have been to consider
the whole as one game only. For instance, the problematic would be to determine under which
conditions on both the set of available messages and the playerspreferences full revelation occurs
at equilibrium. This question has already been tackled in Mathis (2008).
We assume that the experts private information is one-dimensional. We choose to proceed in
that standard way (see Related works) because modeling a multi-dimensional information space
would considerably complicate our study. In particular, as long as the beliefs are about a one-
dimensional state of Nature, how to link updated beliefs with evidence is not obvious. Indeed,
whenever the expert transmits an incomplete le sustaining a given state of Nature, whether the
decision-maker should infer that the possibly missing documents are actually sustaining this state
or the other is not clear.
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Related works
The analysis of cheap-talk game4 was rst explored by Crawford and Sobel (1982). They examine
a sender-receiver game in which the sender has private information that the receiver, who must take
a decision that a¤ects them both, would like to know. In particular, they show that when agents
have di¤erent preferences and when the report is unprovable, full revelation does not occur in
equilibrium.
There exists a substantial literature considering strategic transmission of hard information be-
tween a self-interested expert and an uninformed decision-maker5.
Some of this work consider a context of complete provability i.e., assuming that the informed
party has ability to prove both all his decision-relevant information and that he is not withholding
information (e.g., Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007), Grossman (1981), Grossman and Hart (1980),
Koessler (2003), Matthews and Postlewaite (1985), Milgrom (1981), Milgrom and Roberts (1986)).
The central result called as the unraveling argument (demonstrated in a general setting by Seidmann
andWinter (1997)) is that at equilibrium, by using a skepticism strategy the decision-maker succeeds
to fully extract the informed partys private information. Skepticism strategy consists in choosing
an action relying on a worst case inference when the informed party does not reveal all his private
information. The decision-maker has no di¢ culty to detect any withholding of information since
the provability is complete.
Most of the literature that considers partial provability  i.e., where the informed party has
ability to certify something but not everything  focuses on an informed party with monotonic
preferences i.e., willing the decision-maker to maximize (or minimize) the magnitude of his action.
Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) show that the unraveling argument extends to a situation where the
decision-maker knows that the informed party wants to maximize the magnitude of his decision and
is able to prove that the observed information is at least as favorable than a certain threshold6.
Shin (1994a, 1994b) provides a model in which the expert is unable to prove the precision of his
information. A skeptical inference then might be irrational and the author shows that there is no
fully revealing equilibrium. Wolinsky (2003) considers a situation where the decision-maker does
not know whether the expert is of a type that wants to maximize or minimize the magnitude of a
certain action. In this setting, he characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome as a combination of
the equilibria that would prevails in the certainty experts preferences world.
Only very recent literature deals with situation where the experts most preferred action de-
pends on his decision-relevant private information in a setting of partial provability. Mathis (2008)
generalizes Seidmann and Winters (1997) results to the partial provability setting. He provides
necessary and su¢ cient conditions on both playerspreferences and information that can be certi-
ed for a Sender-Receiver game to possess a separating equilibrium, as well as su¢ cient conditions
4For a survey on cheap-talk games see Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Krishna and Morgan (2008).
5For a survey on Persuasion games see Forges and Koessler (2009).
6Although the authors study a situation with several experts, the full revelation of information does not rely on
the expertscompetition (contrary to Lipman and Seppi (1995)).
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for any equilibrium of such a game to be separating. Lanzi and Mathis (2008) consider a situa-
tion where a decision-maker relies on the report of an expert prior to decide whether to undertake
a certain project. Depending on the information collected, the two players may have conicting
preferences. Information contained in the report is partially veriable in the sense that the expert
can suppress favorable information sustaining the project but he cannot exaggerate it. They show
that this setting favors the agent which is the less eager to undertake the project in that he always
succeeds to induce his most preferred action.
The two closest papers to ours are Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007) and Lanzi and Mathis
(2008).
Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007) consider a game with a continuum of actions and a nite
number of types in which the veriability is strong: the sender has the ability to prove any true
event (formally, any subset of types containing the realized one is certiable). They show that when
the senders preferences are such that there is no pair of types strictly preferring to be misidentied
for one another (single-crossing property) a fully revealing equilibrium exists. This forced informa-
tiveness is then benecial to the Receiver. They also give an example in which the decision-maker
gets an ex-ante higher payo¤ in some cheap-talk equilibrium than in any equilibrium of the initial
game.
Contrary to Giovannoni and Seidmann (2007), we consider a game with a binary set of actions
and a continuum of types in which the provability is partial. The senders preferences satisfy the
Giovannoni-Seidmanns single-crossing property but due to partial provability, a fully revealing
equilibrium may not exist, depending on how playerspreferences are aligned. Our model also rules
out their example. This is due to the absence of two types strictly preferring to be misidentied
for one another. We then establish that resorting to evidence is benecial to the decision-maker by
characterizing and comparing all equilibria of our opinion and evidence games.
Although our paper does not address the same issue, our evidence game generalizes Lanzi and
Mathis (2008) to situation where the decision-maker does not know which action is actually sustained
by the experts private information. In particular, we establish the robustness of their main result
according to which the agent which is the less eager to undertake the project always succeeds to
induce his most preferred action.
In addition, we address for the rst time in the literature, whether or not the certication is
benecial to the expert.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic sender-
receiver game. In particular, we introduce the partial provability structure. Section 3 presents
the equilibrium of each game and the main results of the paper. Section 4 concludes.
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2 The Basic Framework
Communication game. Consider a simple communication game in which Nature draws a state from
a binary set 
  fX;Y g, whose typical element will be denoted !. There is a prior equiprobable
distribution on the states of Nature. The expert (S) observes a binary signal  2 fx;yg correlated
with ! according to a given probability p  P ( = ! j !) and then sends a message m 2M to the
decision-maker (R), who then must take an action a 2 fx; yg that determines the welfare of both.
Preferences. The vNM payo¤ of the player i, with i = S;R, is a function ui : fx; yg  
 7! R
where ui(a; !) denotes the is utility level when action a is taken under the state of Nature !. Let
action x (resp. y) be appropriate in state X (resp. Y ), i:e: ui(x;X) > ui(y;X) (resp. ui(y; Y ) >
ui(x; Y )). Thus, by denoting pi to be the is posterior belief that ! = Y , we have
Epi [ui(y; :)] > Epi [ui(x; :)]
() pi > u
i(x;X)  ui(y;X)
ui(x;X)  ui(y;X) + ui(y; Y )  ui(x; Y )  q
i 2 (0; 1)
The parameter qi exactly characterizes the player is threshold of indi¤erence between the two
decisions, i:e: the agent i will prefer the action y to the action x i¤ he believes the state of Nature
is Y with probability pi higher than qi. We call the is most preferred action according to his prior
belief the is uninformed action, i:e: the action y if qi  12 and x if qi  12 . We say that player i is
the least eager to undertake the project a if for j 6= i (12  qj  qi and a = y) or (qi  qj  12 and
a = x). In words, player i is the least eager to undertake the project y if both playersuninformed
action is x and preferring the action y requires for i a higher beliefs that the state of Nature is Y
than does the other player. If there is no least eager agent i:e: if qi < 12 < q
j , then the players
are in conict at the uninformed action. In the remainder, we assume that qS  qR, but given the
symmetry of the model this is without loss of generality and could be reversed since state X (with
respect to Y ) is arbitrarily dened. Figure 1 depicts the full information benchmark for players
preferences.
pS
qRqS
Figure 1: Full information benchmark
Both players Both players
prefer x prefer y
S prefers y
R prefers x
10
-
Experts Information. We denote by p  P ( = ! j !) the Ss signal quality (information
precision) which denotes the probability that S receives the correctsignal, i.e. the signal  = !
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in state !. We assume that the Ss signal  and signal quality p are both private information of
the expert. We assume that p is uniformly distributed on [12 ; 1]
7.
Experts Posterior Belief. Let pS = P (! = Y j ; p) 2 [0; 1] denotes the Ss updated belief
(or opinion) that the state of Nature is Y , considering the signal  and the signal quality p are
observed. Since the two states of Nature are equiprobable we have:
pS  P (! = Y j ; p) =
(
p if  = y
1  p if  = x
Since R does not observe neither the Ss signal  nor the Ss signal quality p all the Ss payo¤
relevant private information is dened by the pair (; p) 2 fx;yg  [12 ; 1] or equivalently by the Ss
updated beliefs pS 2 [0; 1]. We then consider the S-type which denotes all the Ss payo¤ relevant
private information as the Ss updated beliefs pS for which the prior distribution is uniform on
the S-type set [0; 1]. We then dene pS [!] = pS if ! = Y ; and pS [!] = 1  pS if ! = X.
Opinion vs Evidence. The two communication games studied have the previous structure and
di¤er only from the set of messages available to the expert.
In the rst game, we suppose that the expert reports only his opinion (formalized by his
updated belief) concerning the desirability of the action a. His set of messages is then [0; 1] and is
not constrained by his private information. So, the set of messages is the same whatever the S-type.
Formally, for any pS 2 [0; 1], M(pS) = [0; 1].
In the second game, the expert has to report evidence put forth as proofs or facts to convince
the decision-maker. In this game, we suppose that the set of messages depends on the information
observed by the expert. We consider an evidence as a list of documents which the expert can present.
For a given signal x or y, each document the expert can provide is a fact exclusively supporting the
signaled state x or y. The more exact the precision is, the more the list of presentable documents is
long and convincing. Consequently to each pair observed (information, precision of information)
is matched a xed list of presentable documents.
We suppose the expert can present either the entire list of documents he has or only a short
version of it according to his will. Besides we suppose that the expert is unable to create or add any
documents he does not have. Thus the expert can delete some information which is favorable to the
signaled state, but he cannot exaggerate it. An evidence incomplete or not is then considered
as a message which proves the inclusion of the observed couple (; p) to a given subset.
Formally, we assume thatM(pS) = [pS ; 12 ] if p
S  12 andM(pS) = [12 ; pS ] if pS  12 . If the expert
receives no relevant information (his updated belief is equal to his prior), then he cannot report
any document or logical proof that substantiates a particular conclusion. We model this limited
possibility for argumentation by considering a singleton for his set of messages formally, for any
 with p = 12 , we have p
S = 12 and M(p
S = 12) = f12g  M(pS0) for any pS0 2 [0; 1]. Alternatively,
7Since the expert observes  and p, assuming p < 1
2
would be irrelevant.
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if S receives an information which constitutes an irrefutable proof that Y is the state of Nature,
then he can report this proof, as he can partially or completely withhold it, but he cannot report
any document substantiating that X is the state of Nature formally, if  = y with p = 1, we have
pS = 1 and M(pS = 1) = [12 ; 1]. While, if S receives an information which constitutes a partial
proof substantiating that X may be the state of Nature, then he can partially or completely report
this information but not exaggerate it formally, if  = x with p 2 (12 ; 1), we have pS = 1  p and
M(pS = 1   p) = [1   p; 12 ]: In both games the whole set of messages will be noted as M , with
M  [pS2[0;1]M(pS) = [0; 1].
The timing of both games is represented by Figure 2.
Figure 2: Timing of the games
Expert learns signal DM updates his
chooses action
Information phase Talking phase Action phase
Expert reports m 2M(pS)
Opinion game: M(pS) = [0; 1]
Evidence game: M(pS) = [ 12 ; p
S ]
if pS > 12 ; M(p
S) = [pS ; 12 ] else
 correlated with state ! w.r.t. p
Both  and p are Ss private information
S updates his belief pS P[! = Y j; p]
belief w.r.t. m and
a 2 fx; yg
Players Strategies. A (mixed) strategy for player R is a map  : M 7! [0; 1]. This has the
interpretation that when R receives the message m, he selects the action y with probability (m).
Here, whatever the played game and the used strategies, we assume that a message m has the
intrinsic meaning that the higher it is, the stronger it recommends playing action y. So, we conne
our attention to Rs strategies which are monotonic and increasing8, that is to the map  : M 7!
[0; 1] that are increasing in m. Recall that S-type is the Ss posterior belief pS 2 [0; 1]. A pure
strategy for player S is a map  : [0; 1] 7!M such that (pS) 2M(pS). This has the interpretation
that when S learns that his type is pS , he selects the message (pS) in his set of available messages
M(pS). We shall not consider Ss mixed strategies9.
In this paper, we are interesting in the S-types payo¤ (or equivalently the interim Ss payo¤)
and the ex-ante Rs payo¤. Let (; ; pR) denote the triple of a S0s message strategy , a R0s action
strategy  and a R0s posterior belief pR which species the Rs conditional beliefs that ! = Y for
each Ss sent message m.
Equilibrium. Our equilibrium concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is sustained
by Rs increasing strategy and Ss pure strategy. For the two games, such equilibrium is described
8 Intrinsic meaning of the messages is not assumed in Lanzi-Mathis (2004) and non-monotonic equilibria outcome
are characterized.
9Ss mixed (distributional) strategies are considered in Lanzi-Mathis (2004).
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by a triple (; ; pR) which satises the following. First, Ss message strategy  maximizes his
expected utility for each S-type pS , taking Rs action strategy  as given, that is for any pS 2 [0; 1];
(pS) 2 arg max
(pS)
E((pS);;pS)[uS(:; :)] (1)
Second, Rs mixed action strategy  maximizes his expected utility, taking his beliefs pR as
induced by the given Ss message strategy , that is
8m 2M; (m)
8><>:
= 0 if pR(m) < qR
2 [0; 1] if pR(m) = qR
= 1 if pR(m) > qR
(2)
Third, for any received message m, R updates his beliefs pR in a consistency10 manner. That is,
if m is on the equilibrium path i.e. m 2 Range()  fm 2M j9pS 2 [0; 1] such that (pS) = mg,
and according to , m is chosen by a nonzero measure set of S-types, then Rs posterior beliefs is
formed using Bayesrule. Formally, whenever
R
fpS j(pS)=mg dp
S > 0, we write:
pR(m) =
R
fpS j(pS)=mg p
SdpSR
fpS j(pS)=mg dp
S
If m 2 Range() but m is a message that is chosen by a measure-zero set of S-types, then
pR(m) is an expectation value of S-types according to any probability distribution that has full
support on the set of S-types that actually send m under the strategy . Say di¤erently, pR(m)
belongs to the convex hull of the set of S-types that send m under the equilibrium strategy, i.e.
pR(m) 2 cofpS j(pS) = mg. Finally, if m is o¤ the equilibrium path i.e. for every pS 2 [0; 1];
(pS) 6= m, then the only constraint is that pR(m) belongs to the set of S-types for whom message
m is available (information set).
Information Set. In the opinion game, for any pS 2 [0; 1], we have M(pS) = [0; 1]. Thus for any
message the information set is [0; 1]. While in the evidence game, M(pS) = [pS ; 12 ] if p
S  12 and
M(pS) = [12 ; p
S ] if pS  12 . Thus, for a given message m 2M the information set is [0;m] if m < 12 ,
[m; 1] if m > 12 and [0; 1] if m =
1
2 .
Equilibria Distinction. A fully revealing equilibrium (FRE ) is an equilibrium (; ; pR) in which
R always learns the true S-type pS . Formally, for any message m received there is a unique S-type
pS 2 [0; 1] such that (pS) = m, and so from consistency we obtain pR(m) = pS . A pooling (or
uninformative) equilibrium is an equilibrium (; ; pR) in which R never learns any information on
the S-type distribution, and then his updated belief pR is equal to his prior whatever the message
he receives. A semi-pooling (or partially informative) equilibrium is an equilibrium (; ; pR) which
is neither FRE nor pooling.
10 see Ramey (1996) for the denition of consistency with a continuum of types.
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Since the goal of this paper is to study whether the use of evidence is benecial we shall use
both the individual playerspayo¤s and the Pareto e¢ ciency concept.
Denition 1. Equilibrium (; ; pR) is Pareto-e¢ cient if there is no triple (; ; pR) that
Rs payo¤ dominates (; ; pR) i:e:
E(;;pR)[uR(:; :)]  E(;;pR)[uR(:; :)];
and that S-types payo¤ dominates (; ; pR) for every S-type i:e:
E(;;pR);pS [uS(:; :)]  E(;;pR);pS [uS(:; :)] for every pS 2 [0; 1];
with at least one strict inequality either for R or for a subset of S-type to which the prior distribution
assigns positive probability11.
Every equilibrium (; ; pR) induces for each S-type pS 2 [0; 1] a conditional distribution over
actions. Usually, this conditional distribution is called the equilibrium outcome. Here, with a
slight abuse of language, we shall call equilibrium outcome such a conditional distribution for every
S-type pS , except for pS = qS12. Observe that messages are costless in these two games. So, to
compare the equilibria playerspayo¤s it shall be su¢ cient to compare their outcomes. We state
this as a property that shall be useful.
Property 1. All equilibria with same outcome induce the same S-types payo¤ for every S-type
and the same (ex-ante) decision-makers payo¤.
In every game where there are less actions than types, two equilibria which do not reveal the
same information may have same outcome. For instance, FRE outcome is the outcome of any
equilibrium for which the decision is the full-information decision. However, due to Property 1,
outcome equivalent equilibrium keeps Pareto-(in)e¢ ciency property.
11Here, considering strict inequality for any non-empty subset of S-type is not appropriate. For instance, increasing
the payo¤ of a particular S-type has no impact on the Rs payo¤. (The Rs payo¤ is the same because a particular
S-type has a prior measure null.)
12The reason is that when pS = qS , rstly S is indi¤erent between both actions, and secondly such a prior measure
zero event fpS = qSg has no impact on the ex-ante Rs payo¤.
12
3 Opinion vs Evidence Games
In this section, we exhibit and compare equilibria from each game.
3.1 Equilibria of the Opinion Game
We now establish the opinion game main result. A well-known result in cheap-talk literature is that
there always exists a pooling equilibrium13. The following proposition establishes that our opinion
game may contain depending on the agents preferences either one or two equilibria outcomes.
Proposition 1 (Outcomes equilibria of the opinion game). In the opinion game there are at
most two outcomes equilibria:
i) A Pareto-ine¢ cient one in which no information is revealed (pooling). It exists whatever the
agentspreferences; and
ii) A Pareto-e¢ cient one, denoted as E(qS), in which the decision-maker learns whether pS is lower
or higher than qS and the expert always succeeds to induce his most preferred action ( i:e: the action
x when pS < qS, and y when pS > qS). It exists if and only if qR  E[pS jpS > qS ].
Figure 3 depicts the outcomes equilibria of the opinion game such as described by Proposition
1.
pS
qRqS 10
-i)
action a, with a = x if qR < 1=2
Figure 3: Outcomes equilibria of the opinion game
pS
qRqS 10
-ii)
E(pS jpS > qS)
action yaction x
Proposition 1 states in particular that our opinion game has an equilibrium in which some
information is (partially) revealed i¤ playerspreferences are su¢ ciently similar i:e: qR  E[pS jpS >
qS ],.or equivalently (qR   qS)  1 qS2 14. Such a result is not surprising and such a condition was
already highlighted by Crawford and Sobel (1982).
13 Indeed, consider the Rs strategy in which R plays his uninformed action whatever the message received. So the
Ss payo¤ will not depend on his strategy and the set of Ss best response is then his whole strategy set. Thus in
particular, the Ss strategy which consists in sending the same message regardless his S-type sustains this Rs strategy.
14Without the assumption that qS  qR this condition would be E[pS jpS < qS ]  qR  E[pS jpS > qS ], or
equivalently jqR   qS j  maxf qS
2
; 1 q
S
2
g.
13
In the semi-pooling equilibrium E(qS), the expert always succeeds to induce his most preferred
action. This is due to the lack of provability constraint and the possibility that the two players could
share the same preferred action for some belief. To see the intuition, suppose that the decision-
makers strategy is such that there are two messages which respectively induce the action x and
y. Since there is no provability constraint, the experts best response is then to send a message
which induces his most preferred action. That is the action x when pS < qS and the action y when
pS > qS . In response, the decision-maker follows the experts messages if and only if the two players
preferences are not too distant. This is the equilibrium E(qS). Otherwise, the decision-maker never
follows the experts messages and takes, by only comparing his threshold of reasonable doubt qR
to his prior, his uninformed action (pooling strategy). This is the pooling equilibrium (existing
whatever the playerspreferences) as represented in the hatched area in Figure 4.
1
qR
qR=qS
qS
1
1/2
1/20
Figure 4: Condition on playerspreferences (with qS  qR) for the existence of opinion game
equilibrium. Hatched area: pooling equilibrium. Shadowed area: E(qS).
Figure 5 illustrates the case where 12 < q
S < qR  1+qS2 when 0 = uR(x;X) > uR(y; Y ) >
uR(x; Y ) > uR(y;X): Proposition 1 states that there are both a pooling equilibrium (in which the
decision-maker always takes his uninformed action x) and a semi-pooling equilibrium in which the
expert succeeds to induce his most preferred action. By comparing to the case where the decision-
maker would be truthfully informed on the expert type (the decision-maker takes the action x if
pS < qR and the action y if pS > qR), the hatched area represents the decision-makers expected loss
induced by the pooling equilibrium, whereas the shadowed area represents it for the semi-pooling
one. By comparing both areas, we can see that the semi-pooling equilibrium induces a higher
ex-ante decision-makers payo¤ than does the pooling one (the shadowed area is smaller than the
hatched one). Suppose that you can switch qS to the left, the semi-pooling equilibrium remains
ex-ante decision-makers payo¤ superior (the shadowed area remains smaller than the hatched one)
as long as qR  E[pS jpS > qS ].
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0
uR(y; Y )
1=2 1
uR(x;X)
uR(x; Y )
uR(y;X)
EpR [u
R(y; :)]
qS qR E[pS jpS > qS ]
EpR [u
R(x; :)]
pR
Figure 5: R0s expected loss (w.r.t. full information) induced by
pooling equilibrium (hatched area) and E(qS) (shadowed area).
3.2 Equilibria of the Evidence Game
We now consider the equilibria of the evidence game. Since the expert has to prove some facts by
arguing, there is no pooling equilibrium. This is due to the fact that when pS < minfqS ; qR; 12g
(resp. pS > maxfqS ; qR; 12g), the expert can convince the decision-maker to take the action x (resp.
action y) by simply reporting pS . More generally, since we suppose that qS  qR we have the
following property:
Property 2. Any outcome equilibrium of the evidence game induces action x for every pS <
minfqS ; 12g, and action y for every pS > maxfqR; 12g.
Proposition 2 exhibits the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game.
Proposition 2 (Outcomes Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game). Outcomes Pareto-
e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game are such that:
i) if qR  E[pS jpS > qS ] then there is an outcome equilibrium, denoted as E(qS), in which the
expert succeeds to induce his most preferred action;
ii) if qR > 12 , then there is a fully revealing outcome equilibrium (FRE). More generally for any
q 2 [qS ; qR] such that q > 12 and qR  E[pS jpS > q], there is an outcome equilibrium which is
partially (or fully when q = qR) revealing, denoted as E(q), which induces the action x when pS < q
and the action y when pS  q;
iii) if qR = 12 , then there is a fully revealing outcome equilibrium (FRE).
There is no other outcome Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium.
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Figure 6 depicts the outcomes Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game such as described
by Proposition 2.
qRqS 10
-i)
E(pS jpS > qS)
action x action y
pS
qRqS 10
-ii)
E(pS jpS > q)
action x action y( 12 < q)
pS
q
Figure 6: Outcomes Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game
qR = 12
10
-iii)
action x action y
pS
The rst kind of equilibrium, E(qS) corresponds to the semi-pooling equilibrium outcome of the
opinion game. The expert always succeeds to induce his most preferred action.
The second kind of equilibrium, E(q) which in fact is a continuum of equilibrium parameterized
by q corresponds either to the case where the two agents do not have the same uninformed action
(qS < 12 < q
R) or to the case where the decision-maker is the less eager agent (12  qS). In both
cases, the decision-maker uses a skepticism strategy to constraint the expert to partially reveal his
type pS . Here this skepticism strategy consists in threatening to take his uninformed action unless
the expert convinces him by reporting su¢ cient evidence. That is, when qR < 12 (resp. q
R > 12), the
decision-maker takes the action y (resp. x) unless he receives a message m  qR (resp. m  qR).
If q = qR, then the E(q = qR) equilibrium outcome contains the FRE and also all semi-pooling
equilibria in which the decision-maker induces his most preferred action but the expert withholds
piece of information (e:g:; by sending the same message m = qR for every S-type pS > qR). But
all of these equilibria have the following property: the decision-maker uses skepticism strategy in
which, since qR > 12 , he takes the uninformed action x as long as, by reporting some evidence the
expert does not prove that his S-type pS is greater than the decision-makers threshold of reasonable
doubt qR.
If q < qR; then the E(q) equilibrium outcome can only be constituted by semi-pooling equilibria.
In this continuum of equilibrium parameterized by q 2 [qS ; qR); the decision-maker uses a more
subtle strategy which we call weakened skepticism strategy. The weakened skepticism strategy
consists of taking the action x as long as the expert does not provide evidence that his S-type
pS is greater than a weakened threshold of reasonable doubt q 2 [qS ; qR). On the interval [qS ; q),
the decision-maker succeeds to induce his most preferred action x which is not the most preferred
action of the expert. On the contrary on the interval [q; qR], the expert succeeds to induce his most
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preferred action y which is not the most preferred action of the decision-maker. The lower is q, the
less is the skepticism of the decision-maker. The case where q = qS > 12 , corresponds to E(qS):
The third kind of equilibrium is trivial. Since qR = 12 , any strategy of the decision-maker which
satisfy (2) and a rational updating must satisfy (m) = 0 for any m < 12 , and (m) = 1 for any
m > 12 . Thus, such strategy  either sustain the rst kind of equilibrium E(qS) provided that
qR  E[pS jpS > qS ] or a fully revealing equilibrium.
In a game of persuasion where there is uncertainty about what the informed party exactly knows
i:e: the decision-maker does not know whether the expert has perfectly observed the state of Nature
Shin (1994a,b) states that there is no fully revealing equilibrium. In our evidence game, when the
expert is not the least eager agent such equilibrium does exist. This is although the precision of the
information coming from the expert is also unknown to the decision-maker. In these two models of
persuasion games, when the expert sends a message which does not perfectly reveals the state of
Nature the decision-maker cannot detect whether the expert is withholding information because the
expert privately observes the precision of his information. In the models of Shin (1994a,b), there
are no uncertainty about the experts preferences, so the decision-maker has ability to identify the
experts least favorable action. However, in his models to any distinct state of nature corresponds a
distinct appropriate action. Consequently, when the decision-maker receives a message which does
not perfectly reveal the state of nature, the experts least favorable action might not correspond to
the action which is appropriate to the actual state of Nature. Thus skepticisms may be costly and
a non-credible threat. In our evidence game, the situation is di¤erent. Either the expert is not the
least eager agent so that a skepticisms strategy is costless for the decision-maker as he threat consists
in selecting his own preferred action; hence a fully revealing equilibrium exists. Or the expert is the
least eager agent which means that a skepticisms strategy is not a threat as the decision-maker is
selecting the experts preferred action; hence there is no fully revealing equilibrium.
Our evidence game generalizes the situation studied by Lanzi and Mathis (2008). They consider
a situation where a decision-maker relies on the report of an expert prior to decide whether to
undertake a certain project. Depending on the information collected, the two agents may have
conicting preferences. Information contained in the report is partially veriable in the sense that
the expert can suppress favorable information sustaining the project but he cannot exaggerate it.
They show that this setting favors the agent which is the less eager to undertake the project in
that he always succeeds to induce his most preferred action. Here, their set-up is extended to
situation where the decision-maker does not know which action is actually sustained by the experts
private information. (Formally, he does not know whether pS is higher or lower than 12 ; and
information sustaining state X as well as state Y can be suppressed.) Our Proposition 2 establishes
the robustness of their main result according to which the agent which is the less eager to undertake
the project always succeeds to induce his most preferred action.
All these equilibria have a common structure in that the induced action is x when pS < qS and
y when pS > qR. It seems to be natural since both players are in conict at the full information
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decision only when pS 2 [qS ; qR]. However, the following lemma establishes the existence of other
equilibrium in the evidence game. These are supported by a more aggressive R0s skepticism strategy.
In these equilibria, the decision-maker threaten to take the more unfavorable action (for both
players) as long as the expert transmits an information which is potentially transmissible by every
Ss types, i:e: if m = 12 . Indeed, by sending such a message m =
1
2 , the expert presents no element
of proof to the decision-maker. The following denition formally denes this strategy.
Denition 3. If both agents have the same unique uninformed action, a decision-makers
strategy  is an aggressive-skepticism strategy if the uninformed action is not chosen surely
when the expert brings no information i:e: [qS > 12 and (
1
2) > 0] or [q
R < 12 and (
1
2) < 1].
Lemma 1 states that any Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibrium of the evidence game is supported by a
decision-makers aggressive-skepticism strategy.
Lemma 1 (Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game). An equilibrium of the evidence
game is Pareto-ine¢ cient i¤ it is supported by a decision-makers aggressive-skepticism strategy.
Moreover, if preferences are su¢ ciently distant, that is if qR > E[pS jpS > qS ], then there is no
Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibrium.
All ine¢ cient equilibria (see Denition 1) are supported by a strategy in which the decision-
maker threatens to select the most unfavorable action for both agents when the expert brings
no evidence. This result highlights a perversee¤ect by which the players coordinate each other
on equilibria inducing a payo¤ which is inferior to the one reached at equilibrium of the opinion
game. This only occurs if agentspreferences are similar enough. On the contrary, when the agents
preferences are distant enough the evidence game has no equilibrium supported by a decision-makers
aggressive-skepticism strategy.
3.3 Equilibria Comparison
When preferences are su¢ ciently distant, Proposition 1 establishes that the unique equilibrium of
the opinion game is the Pareto-ine¢ cient pooling one. Whereas Lemma 1 establishes that there
is no Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibrium in the evidence game. This establishes a sense in which, when
preferences are su¢ ciently distant, requiring evidence is benecial to both players.
The equilibria comparison between both games is summarized in the following result.
Proposition 3 (Equilibria Comparison). i) If preferences are su¢ ciently distant, that is if
qR > E[pS jpS > qS ], then requiring evidence is benecial for both agents in the sense that all
equilibria of the evidence game players payo¤s dominates the unique equilibrium of the opinion
game.
ii) If preferences are su¢ ciently similar, that is if qR  E[pS jpS > qS ], then requiring evidence is:
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 benecial for the decision-maker in the sense that all Pareto-e¢ cient (resp. ine¢ cient) equi-
libria of the evidence game the decision-makers payo¤ dominates all (resp. the ine¢ cient)
equilibria of the opinion game;
 not benecial for the expert in the sense that, for every S-type, the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium
of the opinion game S-types payo¤ dominates all equilibria of the evidence game.
When preferences are su¢ ciently similar, the opinion game contains a unique Pareto-e¢ cient
equilibrium, denoted as E(qS) where the expert always succeeds to induce his most preferred action.
In the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game the expert is potentially compelled by the
decision-makers (weakened) skepticism strategies and for all q 2 [qS ; qR] the equilibrium E(q) the
decision-makers payo¤ dominates the unique Pareto-ine¢ cient (pooling) equilibrium of the opinion
game (see Claim in the Appendix).
4 Conclusion
In this article, we are interested in the problem of the transmission of the information between a
better informed and self-interested expert and a decision-maker. We have compared two modes of
communication. In the rst one, the expert only reports his opinion (soft information) concerning
the desirability of a certain action. In the second one, he is consulted to report documents (hard
information) supporting his opinion. We have assumed that the ability of the expert to provide
evidence depended on the precision of his information. More specically, the more his information
is precise or substantial the more he is able to provide evidence supporting his opinion. Concerning
the provability through providing evidence, we have supposed that the expert is able to prove
everything he knows. However, since he does not potentially know everything, he is unable to
prove that he does not hide additional information. The question raised has been to know who
would benet from the resorting to evidence, knowing that it modies the manipulability of the
information. In order to answer this question, we have compared the equilibria of both games ruled
by these two modes of communication based on the concept of Pareto-e¢ ciency and the players
payo¤. We have demonstrated that resorting to evidence is always benecial to the decision-maker.
This rst result can seem intuitive but the literature has a counter-example in which the expert can
prove everything he knows and also he does not hide any information (Giovannoni and Seidmann
(2007)). We have also demonstrated that resorting to evidence is benecial to the expert if and
only if both players have preferences which are distant enough. The intuition is simple. When
the agentspreferences are distant enough, in the absence of convincing proofs the decision-maker
does not trust the expert and chooses an action according to his prior belief. Only resorting to
evidence can then enable the expert to convince the decision-maker (whenever the information he
has observed is determining enough). On the contrary, if the preferences are not distant enough,
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the decision-maker always completely trusts the expert when consulted on the basis of his opinion.
However requiring evidence makes it possible for the decision-maker to behave skeptically and then
extract all or some pieces of the information held by the expert.
In this study, we have chosen a specic form of communication. The experts ability to provide
evidence is objective and directly depends on the quality of the information he has observed. For
instance, if we suppose there is a positive correlation between the skills of an expert and the quality
of his expertise regarding the acquired information, our modeling of the information mentions he
will be more likely to provide the decision-maker with irrefutable proofs. This model does not
tackle the more subjective aspect of the communication in which the semantic contents given the
set of messages would be di¤erent. We think for instance to the rhetoric qualities of a salesman
who, even with some non-precise information on the quality of the proposed product, would be able
to convince many consumers to buy it. An extension of this study would be to model this more
subjective form of the argumentation.
Also our model is quite simple since we have considered two states of Nature but a continuum
of types , two decisions and an interaction between two players only. Another extension of this
article would be to consider the evidence game with N experts. Thus we will get a quite relevant
debate model in which the ability of the agents to provide evidence would depend on their private
information. This is little studied in the literature cf. Glazer and Rubinstein (2001, 2004) for
debates models between two experts with provable information. Moreover this extension would be
the direct extension of Lipman and Seppi (1995) to the case where experts may observe di¤erent
information.
Appendix
The appendix is organized as follows. Since Property 1 is trivial, we do not expose its proof.
Appendix A states the proof of Proposition 1. Appendix B starts with the proof of Property 2 and
Proposition 2. Then we states Proposition 4 that exhibits the Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibria of the
evidence game. As in the proof of Proposition 2, the proof of Proposition 4 requires the Lemma 2
next introduced. The proof of Lemma 1 is then established. Finally, in Appendix C we demonstrate
Proposition 3.
In the following, remember that when reasoning on the outcome equilibrium equivalence, it shall
not be required to specify any action distribution at the point pS = qS .
Proof of Property 1. See Lemma 1 in Lanzi and Mathis (2004).
Appendix A: Equilibria of the Opinion Game
Proof of Proposition 1. We proceed in three steps. First, to prove existence of each considered
outcome equilibrium, we exhibit an appropriate triple (; ; pR). Second, we demonstrate that any
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equilibrium generates one of the two considered outcomes. Third, we discuss the Pareto-e¢ ciency.
1: Straightforward to (1), (2) and the consistency hypothesis, the two following triple are equilibria.
i) Pooling equilibrium. (; ; pR) such that (pS) does not depend on the S-type pS ; for each message
received m: the Rs belief is equal to the prior i:e: pR(m) = 12 for any m 2 M , and R takes the
action x if qR > 12 , the action y if q
R < 12 , and chooses the action y with any probability if q
R = 12 .
ii) E(qS): (; ; pR) such that:
(pS) =
(
fmxg if pS  qS
fmyg if pS > qS
; with mx;my 2M , mx 6= my;
(m) =
(
0 if m = mx
1 if m = my
and pR(m) =
(
qS
2 if m = mx
qS+1
2 if m = my
,
and else (m is o¤ the equilibrium path): (m) is any constant in [0; 1] and pR(m) = qR:
2: Assume (; ; pR) is an equilibrium. There are two distinct cases:
(i) R adopts the same strategy whatever the message received i:e: for any m1;m2 2 M , we have
(m1) = (m2). Therefore (; ; pR) is a pooling equilibrium.
(ii) There are two messages for which the Rs strategy is di¤erent i:e: there are m1 and m2 such that
(m1) < (m2). Due to the increase of  on M , we have 0  (0)  (m1) < (m2)  (1)  1.
By (2), we then have pR(0)  qR  pR(1). And by (1), we must have for any pS < qS , (pS) 2
fm 2 M j(m) = (0)g and for any pS > qS , (pS) 2 fm 2 M j(m) = (1)g. This satisfy (2)
and the consistency hypothesis only if q
S
2  qR  1+q
S
2 . From q
S  qR, we obtain that the triple
(; ; pR) necessarily generates the equilibrium outcome E(qS).
3: The pooling equilibrium is not Pareto-e¢ cient since qi =2 f0; 1g, i = R;S. The partially revealing
equilibrium E(qS) is Pareto-e¢ cient since each S-type succeeds to induce his most preferred action
while it is not possible to increase the Rs payo¤without decreasing the payo¤ of a subset of S-type
to which the prior distribution assigns positive probability. 
Appendix B: Equilibria of the Evidence Game
Proof of Property 2. Assume that triple (; ; pR) is an equilibrium. From (2) and consistency
hypothesis, pR and  are such that:
8m < minfqR; 1
2
g; pR(m) < qR and (m) = 0
8m > maxfqR; 1
2
g; pR(m) > qR and (m) = 1
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and from (1),  must then satises:
8pS < minfqS ; 1
2
g, (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 0g
8pS > maxfqR; 1
2
g, (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 1g

Proof of Proposition 2. As in proof of Proposition 1, we proceed in three steps. First, to
prove existence of each considered outcome equilibrium, we exhibit an appropriate triple (; ; pR).
Second, we show that these equilibria are Pareto-e¢ cient. Third, we demonstrate that all equilibria
which are Pareto-e¢ cient necessarily generate one of the considered outcomes.
1: Straightforward to (1), (2) and the consistency hypothesis the three following triples are equilibria.
For all these triples, if m is o¤ the equilibrium path it su¢ ces to consider that (m) satises (2)
with pR(m) = m:
i) E(qS): If qS  12 , (; ; pR) such that:
(pS) =
(
pS if pS < qS
1
2 if p
S  qS ;
(m) =
(
0 if m < qS
1 if m = 12
and pR(m) =
(
m if m < qS
1+qS
2 if m =
1
2
.
If qS > 12 then consider E(q) with q = qS .
ii) E(q): (; ; pR) such that:
(pS) =
(
1
2 if p
S < q
q if pS  q ;
(m) =
(
0 if m = 12
1 if m = q
and pR(m) =
(
q
2 if m =
1
2
1+q
2 if m = q
:
iii) FRE. (; ; pR) such that: pR(m) = m for any m 2 M ; (m) = 0 if m  12 and 1 else;
(pS) = pS .
2: According to the following remarks, all of these equilibria are Pareto-e¢ cient.
i) E(qS). As in the proof of Proposition 1. Each S-type succeeds to induce his most preferred
action while it is not possible to increase the Rs payo¤ without decreasing the payo¤ for a subset
of S-type to which the prior distribution assigns positive probability.
ii) E(q). Each S-type pS 2 [0; qS ] [ [q; 1] succeeds to induce his most preferred action while on the
open interval (qS ; q) the players do not share the same preferred action and the Rs ex-ante payo¤
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is maximal.
iii) FRE. R is fully informed and succeeds to induce his most preferred action while it is not
possible to increase the payo¤ for a subset of S-type to which the prior distribution assigns positive
probability without decreasing the Rs payo¤.
3: Straightforward from Lemma 2 (see below). 
Before establishing the Proof of Lemma 1, we need the two following results.
Proposition 4 (Evidence game Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibria). Outcomes Pareto-ine¢ cient equi-
libria of the evidence game are such that:
i) if 14  qR < 12 then there is an equilibrium, denoted as E(12), which induces the action x when
pS  12 and y when pS > 12 ;
ii) if qR =
qS+ 1
2
2 <
1
2 then there is an equilibrium, denoted as E(), which induces the action x
when pS < qS the action y when pS > 12 and the action y with probability  2 (0; 1) if pS 2 [qS ; 12 ];
iii) if 12 < q
S and qR < 34 , then there is an equilibrium, denoted as E(12
0
), which induces the action
x when pS < 12 and the action y when p
S  12 .
Proof of Proposition 4. We proceed in three steps. First, to prove existence of each considered
outcome, we exhibit an appropriate triple (; ; pR). Second, we show that these equilibria are
Pareto-ine¢ cient. Third, we demonstrate that all Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibria necessarily generate
one of the considered outcomes.
1: Straightforward to (1), (2) and the consistency hypothesis the three following triples support
equilibria.
i) E(12): (; ; pR) such that:
(pS) =
(
1
2 if p
S  12
pS if pS > 12
;
(m) =
(
0 if m = 12
1 if m > 12
and pR(m) =
(
1
4 if m =
1
2
m if m > 12
,
if m is o¤ the equilibrium path (i:e: m < 12) then (m) = 0 and p
R(m)  qR:
ii) E(). (; ; pR) such that:
(pS) =
8><>:
pS if pS < qS
1
2 if p
S 2 [qS ; 12 ]
pS if pS > 12
;
(m) =
8><>:
0 if m < qS
 if m = 12
1 if m > 12
and pR(m) =
8>><>>:
m if m < qS
qS+ 1
2
2 if m =
1
2
m if m > 12
,
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if m is o¤ the equilibrium path (i:e: m 2 [qS ; 12)) then (m) = 0 and pR(m)  qR:
iii) E(12
0
): (; ; pR) such that:
(pS) =
(
1
2 if p
S  12
pS if pS < 12
;
(m) =
(
0 if m < 12
1 if m = 12
and pR(m) =
(
m if m < 12
3
4 if m =
1
2
,
if m is o¤ the equilibrium path (i:e: m > 12) then (m) = 1 and p
R(m)  qR:
2: For each considered equilibrium, we exhibit an outcome which Pareto-dominates it.
i) E(12). Since qR < 12 , E(12) is Pareto-dominated by the outcome which induces the action x if
pS  qR and y if pS > qR.
ii) E(). Since  > 0 and qS < 12 , E() is Pareto-dominated by E(qS).
iii) E(12
0
). Since qS > 12 , E(12
0
) is Pareto-dominated by E(qS).
3: Straightforward from Lemma 2 (see below). 
Lemma 2: There is no other outcome equilibrium supported by an Rs monotone increasing
strategy and an Ss pure strategy than those exhibited in Proposition 2 and Proposition 4.
Proof of Lemma 2. We proceed in two steps. First we prove the result in the case qR  12 ,
second in the case qR > 12 . Assume (; ; p
R) is an equilibrium where  is an Ss pure strategy and
 is an Rs monotone increasing strategy.
1: Suppose qR  12 . By Property 2, for any pS < qS ; (pS) 2 fm 2 M(pS)j(m) = 0g 6= ; and for
any pS > 12 ; (p
S) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 1g 6= ;. So (; ; pR) induces the action x if pS < qS and
y if pS > 12 . Now, to determine the induced action when p
S 2 [qS ; 12 ] we distinguish di¤erent cases.
By (2) and the consistency hypothesis, for any m < qR  12 ; we have pR (m) < qR and (m) = 0.
(i) Suppose (12) 2 (0; 1). Then by (2) we have pR (12) = qR. By increase of the Rs strategy, for all
m  12 , we have (m)  (12), and by (1), for any pS 2 (qS ; 12 ]; (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = (12)g.
(i)(a) If qR = 12 then by the consistency hypothesis, we must have q
S = qR. Property 2 implies
that the equilibrium outcome (; ; pR) must be the one generated by the FRE.
(i)(b) If qR < 12 since by denition (
1
2) =
1
2 , then by the consistency hypothesis, there is p
S 2
[qS ; qR) such that (pS) = 12 . For all p
S 2 (qS ; 12 ], since for any m 2 (pS), pR (m) = qR, we then
have qR =
qS+ 1
2
2 . Moreover, equilibrium (; ; p
R) must induces the action x if pS < qS , the action
y if pS > 12 and the action x with probability (
1
2) 2 (0; 1) if pS 2 (qS ; 12 ]. Therefore, (; ; pR)
generates the outcome equilibrium E( = (12)).
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(ii) Suppose (12) = 0. By increase of the Rs strategy, and by (2), for all m  12 we have (m) = 0
and pR(m)  qR:
(ii)(a) If qR = 12 then the outcome equilibrium (; ; p
R) must be the one generated by the FRE.
(ii)(b) If qR < 12 then [q
R; 12) 6= ;. Since the prior is uniform, a necessary condition for the
equilibrium existence is that qR  14 . Moreover, equilibrium (; ; pR) must induces the action x if
pS  12 and the action y if pS > 12 . Therefore, (; ; pR) generates the outcome equilibrium E(12):
(iii) Suppose (12) = 1.
So for any pS > qS , (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 1g 6= ;. A necessary condition for the equilibrium
existence is that qR  1+qS2 : Thus, the equilibrium (; ; pR) must induces the action x if pS < qS
and the action y if pS > qS . Therefore, (; ; pR) generates the outcome equilibrium E(qS).
2: Suppose qR > 12 . By Property 2, for any p
S < minf12 ; qSg; (pS) 2 fm 2 M(pS)j(m) = 0g 6= ;
and for any pS > qR; (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 1g 6= ;.
(i) Suppose (12) = 0. Then by (1), for any p
S < qS ; (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 0g 6= ;.
(i)(a) Suppose there is a message m0 2 (12 ; qR) such that (m0) > 0. Then by (2) we have pR (m0) 
qR. Thus, there is pS > qR such that m0 = (pS) and by (1), we must have (m0) = 1: Let M=1 
fm 2 (12 ; qR)j(m) = 1g. For all pS 2M=1n[0; qS ], we have (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 1g 6= ;.
Let m0 = infM=1. For such a m0 2 (12 ; qR) such that qR  m
0+1
2 if m
0  qS and such that
qR  qS+12 else, equilibrium (; ; pR) must induces the action x if pS < maxfm0; qSg, the action y
if pS > maxfm0; qSg and the action x (resp. y) if pS = m0 andm0 =2 infM=1 (resp. m0 2 infM=1).
So, (; ; pR) generates the outcome equilibrium E(q = maxfm0; qSg).
(i)(b) Suppose for any m 2 (12 ; qR); (m) = 0. Hence, equilibrium (; ; pR) must induces the
action x if pS  qR and the action y if pS > qR. So, (; ; pR) generates the outcome equilibrium
E(q = qR).
(ii) Suppose (12) = 1. By increase of the Rs strategy, we have (m) = 1 for all m  12 .
(ii)(a) If qS  12 < qR, trivially a necessary condition on the existence of the equilibrium is that
qR  1+qS2 . So, the equilibrium (; ; pR) must induces the action x if pS < qS and the action y if
pS > qS . Thus, (; ; pR) generates the outcome equilibrium E(q = qS).
(ii)(b) If 12 < q
S  qR, then by (1), for any pS 2 (qS ; 1]; (pS) 2 fm 2M(pS)j(m) = 1g 6= ;. Since
the prior distribution is uniform, a necessary condition on the existence of an equilibrium is that
qR  34 . So, equilibrium (; ; pR) must induces the action x if pS < 12 and the action y if pS  12 .
Thus, (; ; pR) generates the outcome equilibrium E(12
0
).
(iii) Suppose (12) 2 (0; 1). Then by (2) we have pR (12) = qR and by (1) we have for any pS > qR;
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1
2 6= (pS) 2 fm 2 M(pS)j(m) = 1g 6= ; whereas (12 j12) = 1, contrary to the consistency
hypothesis. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Firstly, let us prove that none of the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium is
supported by an Rs aggressive skepticism strategy while this is the case for Pareto-ine¢ cient equi-
librium. From Lemma 2, all equilibria of the evidence game generate the outcome being either
exhibited in Proposition 2 or Proposition 4. We need to prove that the Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibria
are exactly those considered in Proposition 4. From the proof of Lemma 2, the following outcome
equilibria are supported by an Rs aggressive skepticism strategy: E() case 1(i)(b) where qR < 12
and (12) 2 (0; 1); E(12) case 1(ii)(b) where qR < 12 and (12) = 0; E(12
0
) case 2(ii)(b) where 12 < q
S
and (12) = 1. All these outcomes are those exhibited in Proposition 4.
From the proof of Lemma 2, none of the following outcome equilibrium is supported by an Rs ag-
gressive skepticism strategy. FRE: case 1(i)(a) and 1(ii)(a) where qR = 12 ; E(qS): case 1(iii) where
qR  12 and (12) = 1 and case 2(ii)(a) where qS  12 < qR; E(q): case 2(i)(a) where 12 < qR
and (12) = 0 and case 2(i)(b) where q = q
R: All these outcomes equilibria are those exhibited in
Proposition 2.
Secondly, let us prove that if preferences are su¢ ciently distant then there is no equilibrium sup-
ported by an Rs aggressive skepticism strategy. If preferences are su¢ ciently distant, that is
(qR   qS) > 1 qS2 , then qR > 1+q
S
2  12 . So, qR > 12 and if qS > 12 then qR > 34 . Hence, from
Proposition 4, there is no Pareto-ine¢ cient equilibrium (and hence supported by an Rs aggressive
skepticism strategy). 
Appendix C: Equilibria Comparison
Remember that by Property 1, to study the equilibria playerspayo¤, we shall only need to compare
the outcomes equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 3. Firstly, we prove the result for the Rs payo¤ and secondly for the
Ss payo¤.
1: a) Let us show that whatever the preferences, all equilibria of the evidence game ex-ante Rs
payo¤ dominates the pooling equilibrium of the opinion game. For this, consider the following
Claim. Trivially, any signaling game where messages are costless possesses a pooling equilibrium.
Claim. For any signaling game where messages are costless, the lower ex-ante Rs equilibrium
payo¤ is that of the pooling equilibrium.
Proof of the Claim. Let (; ; pR) and (0; 0; pR0) be two equilibria. If (0; 0; pR0) is pooling
then whatever the Ss strategy ~, the Rs payo¤ is the same under (0; 0; pR0) and (~; 0; pR0) since
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messages are costless. In particular for ~ = . Now, since (; ; pR) is an equilibrium, the pair
(; pR) must be a Rs best response to . Then (; ; pR) Rs payo¤ dominates (0; 0; pR0). 
b) Let us show that when the preferences are not su¢ ciently distant, all Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria
of the evidence game ex-ante Rs payo¤ dominates the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium of the opinion
game. From Proposition 2, the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibria of the evidence game induces the action
x for every pS < qS and the action y for every pS > qR. The partially revealing equilibrium of the
opinion game has also this outcome distribution while it induces the Rs least preferred action for
every pS 2 (qS ; qR).
2: a) Let us show that when the preferences are su¢ ciently distant, all equilibria of the evidence
game S-types payo¤ dominates the pooling equilibrium of the opinion game. Since qR > 1+q
S
2  12 ,
the pooling equilibrium of the opinion game induce the action x for every pS . From Lemma 1, all
equilibria of the evidence game are Pareto-e¢ cient and induces the action x for every pS < qS while
they induce the action y for every pS > qR.
b) Since in E(qS), each S-type succeeds to induces his most preferred action, this establishes that
when the preferences are not su¢ ciently distant, the Pareto-e¢ cient equilibrium of the opinion
game S-types payo¤ dominates all equilibria of the evidence game. 
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